AFRICOM is unpopular in Africa—it is seen as a reassertion of American power Africa Focus (Is an independent electronic publication providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus Bulletin is edited by William Minter, “Questioning AFRICOM” 8/1/07. http://allafrica.com/stories/200708010836.html) [Gunnarsdottir]
That AFRICOM will have such a significant civilian component does not impress many African observers, for whom even the word 'command' suggests malign intentions. In Africa the view is widespread that AFRICOM is a tool to secure better access to Africa's natural resources, erode China's growing influence on the continent, and establish forward bases to hunt and destroy networks linked to Al-Qaeda. Moreover, by emphasising AFRICOM's role in development and humanitarian tasks, U.S. officials may have actually amplified African concerns. The fear is that, henceforth, the main lens through which development efforts in Africa are perceived will be the Pentagon's. Washington has underestimated how deep-rooted and ideological African assumptions about U.S. aims can be. To many, AFRICOM is, along with Iraq and Afghanistan, another sign that the U.S. is seeking to re-assert American power and hegemony globally. In the words of Virginia Tilley at South Africa's Human Sciences Research Council, the "Bush administration's agenda offers little but mounting expense and new dangers for African security. The urgent question for South Africa is not how to join that war, but how to help protect Africa from it." Or as Charles Cobb argues, "in the thinking of Pentagon and White House officials, the world today is too dangerous a place not to be policed by Washington." For Cobb "the establishment of AFRICOM is being driven by two main strategic concerns: first, the growing demand for African oil and gas and second, the perceived danger of Islamic radicals." Cobb suggests that Washington's excessive focus on "security tends to erode, if not crush, civil liberties, and those governments on the continent that already show little inclination to support democratic freedoms will almost certainly use 'security' as an excuse to clamp down on things they don't like." But not all African perceptions of AFRICOM are negative. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia spoke for those who feel well-disposed to the initiative when she wrote in June 2007: "AFRICOM should be seen for what it is: recognition of the growing importance of Africa to U.S. national security interests, as well as recognition that long-term African security lies in empowering African partners to develop a healthy security environment through embracing good governance, building security capacity, and developing good civil-military relations. ... AFRICOM is undeniably about the projection of American interests but this does not mean that it is to the exclusion of African ones." Washington hopes all African leaders will eventually share that perspective. But convincing them that AFRICOM is 'military lite' will not be easy. It cannot be denied that, in terms of its structure and declared intent, AFRICOM embodies a fresh attempt to create a joined-up inter-agency strategy that weaves diplomacy, defence, and development into a coherent mechanism.
Africans hate AFRICOM—its base threatens Liberia safe and stability Africa Focus (Is an independent electronic publication providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus Bulletin is edited by William Minter, “Questioning AFRICOM” 8/1/07. http://allafrica.com/stories/200708010836.html) [Gunnarsdottir]
AFRICOM's first public links with the West African country of Liberia was through a Washington Post op-ed written by the AfricanAmerican businessman Robert L. Johnson, "Liberia's Moment of Opportunity." Forcefully endorsing AFRICOM, Johnson urged that it be based in Liberia. Then came an unprecedented allAfrica.com guest column from Liberia's president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, "AFRICOM Can Help Governments Willing To Help Themselves," touting AFRICOM's potential to "help" Africa "develop a stable environment in which civil society can flourish and the quality of life for Africans can be improved." Despite these high-profile endorsements, the consolidation and expansion of U.S. military power on the African continent is misguided and could lead to disastrous outcomes. Liberia's 26-year descent into chaos started when the Reagan administration prioritized military engagement and funneled military hardware, training, and financing to the regime of the ruthless dictator Samuel K. Doe. This military "aid," seen as "soft power" at that time, built the machinery of repression that led to the deaths of an estimated 250,000 Liberians. Basing AFRICOM in Liberia will put Liberians at risk now and into the future.Liberia's national threat level will dramatically increase as the country becomes a target of those interested in attackingU.S.assets. This will severely jeopardize Liberia's national security interests while creating new problems for the country's fragile peace and its nascent democracy. Liberia has already given the Bush administration the exclusive role of restructuring its armed forces. The private U.S. military contractor DYNCORP has been carrying out this function. After more than two years in Liberia and an estimated $800,000 budget allocated, DYNCORP has not only failed to train the 2,000 men it was contracted to train, it has also not engaged Liberia's Legislature or its civil society in defining the nature, content, or character of the new army. DYNCORP allotted itself the prerogative to determine the number of men/women to be trained and the kind of training it would conduct, exclusively infantry training, even though Liberia had not elaborated a national security plan or developed a comprehensive military doctrine. In fact, the creation of Liberia's new army has been the responsibility of another sovereign state, the United States, in total disregard to Liberia's constitution, which empowers the legislature to raise the national army. This pattern of abuse and incompetence with the U.S. military and its surrogate contractors suggests that if AFRICOM is based in Liberia, the Bush administration will have an unacceptable amount of power to dictate Liberia's security interests and orchestrate how the country manages those interests. By placing a military base in Liberia, the United States could systematically interfere in Liberian politics in order to ensure that those who succeed in obtaining power are subservient to U.S. national security and other interests. If this is not neo-colonialism, then what is? Perhaps the South Africans will be the loudest voices on the continent in opposition to AFRICOM. Recent media reports spotlight growing tensions in U.S.-SouthAfricarelations over AFRICOM. The U.S. ambassador to South Africa, Eric Bost, complained that South Africa's defense minister Mosiuoa Lekota, was not responding to embassy requests to meet General Kip Ward, the recently nominated first commander of AFRICOM
AFRICOM is an extension of US military dominance in Africa Africa Focus (Is an independent electronic publication providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus Bulletin is edited by William Minter, “Questioning AFRICOM” 8/1/07. http://allafrica.com/stories/200708010836.html) [Gunnarsdottir] The Bush administration's new obsession with AFRICOM and its militaristic approach has many malign consequences. It increases U.S. interference in the affairs of Africa. It brings more military hardware to a continent that already has too much. By helping to build machineries of repression, these policies reinforce undemocratic practices and reward leaders responsive not to the interests or needs of their people but to the demands and dictates of U.S. military agents. Making military force a higher priority than development and diplomacy creates an imbalance that can encourage irresponsible regimes to use U.S. sourced military might to oppress their own people, now or potentially in the future. These fatally flawed policies create instability, foment tensions, and lead to a less secure world. What Africa needs least is U.S. military expansion on the continent (and elsewhere in the world). What Africa needs most is its own mechanism to respond to peacemaking priorities. Fifty years ago, Kwame Nkrumah sounded the clarion call for a "United States of Africa." One central feature of his call was for an Africa Military High Command. Today, as the African Union deliberates continental governance, there couldn't be a better time to reject U.S. military expansion and push forward African responses to Africa's priorities. Long suffering the effects of militaristic "assistance" from the United States, Liberia would be the worst possible base for AFRICOM. But there are no good locations for such a poorly conceived project. Africa does not need AFRICOM.
Africa Focus (Is an independent electronic publication providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus Bulletin is edited by William Minter, “Questioning AFRICOM” 8/1/07. http://allafrica.com/stories/200708010836.html) [Gunnarsdottir]
That AFRICOM will have such a significant civilian component does not impress many African observers, for whom even the word 'command' suggests malign intentions. In Africa the view is widespread that AFRICOM is a tool to secure better access to Africa's natural resources, erode China's growing influence on the continent, and establish forward bases to hunt and destroy networks linked to Al-Qaeda. Moreover, by emphasising AFRICOM's role in development and humanitarian tasks, U.S. officials may have actually amplified African concerns. The fear is that, henceforth, the main lens through which development efforts in Africa are perceived will be the Pentagon's. Washington has underestimated how deep-rooted and ideological African assumptions about U.S. aims can be. To many, AFRICOM is, along with Iraq and Afghanistan, another sign that the U.S. is seeking to re-assert American power and hegemony globally. In the words of Virginia Tilley at South Africa's Human Sciences Research Council, the "Bush administration's agenda offers little but mounting expense and new dangers for African security. The urgent question for South Africa is not how to join that war, but how to help protect Africa from it." Or as Charles Cobb argues, "in the thinking of Pentagon and White House officials, the world today is too dangerous a place not to be policed by Washington." For Cobb "the establishment of AFRICOM is being driven by two main strategic concerns: first, the growing demand for African oil and gas and second, the perceived danger of Islamic radicals." Cobb suggests that Washington's excessive focus on "security tends to erode, if not crush, civil liberties, and those governments on the continent that already show little inclination to support democratic freedoms will almost certainly use 'security' as an excuse to clamp down on things they don't like." But not all African perceptions of AFRICOM are negative. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia spoke for those who feel well-disposed to the initiative when she wrote in June 2007: "AFRICOM should be seen for what it is: recognition of the growing importance of Africa to U.S. national security interests, as well as recognition that long-term African security lies in empowering African partners to develop a healthy security environment through embracing good governance, building security capacity, and developing good civil-military relations. ... AFRICOM is undeniably about the projection of American interests but this does not mean that it is to the exclusion of African ones." Washington hopes all African leaders will eventually share that perspective. But convincing them that AFRICOM is 'military lite' will not be easy. It cannot be denied that, in terms of its structure and declared intent, AFRICOM embodies a fresh attempt to create a joined-up inter-agency strategy that weaves diplomacy, defence, and development into a coherent mechanism.
Africans hate AFRICOM—its base threatens Liberia safe and stability
Africa Focus (Is an independent electronic publication providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus Bulletin is edited by William Minter, “Questioning AFRICOM” 8/1/07. http://allafrica.com/stories/200708010836.html) [Gunnarsdottir]
AFRICOM's first public links with the West African country of Liberia was through a Washington Post op-ed written by the AfricanAmerican businessman Robert L. Johnson, "Liberia's Moment of Opportunity." Forcefully endorsing AFRICOM, Johnson urged that it be based in Liberia. Then came an unprecedented allAfrica.com guest column from Liberia's president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, "AFRICOM Can Help Governments Willing To Help Themselves," touting AFRICOM's potential to "help" Africa "develop a stable environment in which civil society can flourish and the quality of life for Africans can be improved." Despite these high-profile endorsements, the consolidation and expansion of U.S. military power on the African continent is misguided and could lead to disastrous outcomes. Liberia's 26-year descent into chaos started when the Reagan administration prioritized military engagement and funneled military hardware, training, and financing to the regime of the ruthless dictator Samuel K. Doe. This military "aid," seen as "soft power" at that time, built the machinery of repression that led to the deaths of an estimated 250,000 Liberians. Basing AFRICOM in Liberia will put Liberians at risk now and into the future. Liberia's national threat level will dramatically increase as the country becomes a target of those interested in attacking U.S. assets. This will severely jeopardize Liberia's national security interests while creating new problems for the country's fragile peace and its nascent democracy. Liberia has already given the Bush administration the exclusive role of restructuring its armed forces. The private U.S. military contractor DYNCORP has been carrying out this function. After more than two years in Liberia and an estimated $800,000 budget allocated, DYNCORP has not only failed to train the 2,000 men it was contracted to train, it has also not engaged Liberia's Legislature or its civil society in defining the nature, content, or character of the new army. DYNCORP allotted itself the prerogative to determine the number of men/women to be trained and the kind of training it would conduct, exclusively infantry training, even though Liberia had not elaborated a national security plan or developed a comprehensive military doctrine. In fact, the creation of Liberia's new army has been the responsibility of another sovereign state, the United States, in total disregard to Liberia's constitution, which empowers the legislature to raise the national army. This pattern of abuse and incompetence with the U.S. military and its surrogate contractors suggests that if AFRICOM is based in Liberia, the Bush administration will have an unacceptable amount of power to dictate Liberia's security interests and orchestrate how the country manages those interests. By placing a military base in Liberia, the United States could systematically interfere in Liberian politics in order to ensure that those who succeed in obtaining power are subservient to U.S. national security and other interests. If this is not neo-colonialism, then what is? Perhaps the South Africans will be the loudest voices on the continent in opposition to AFRICOM. Recent media reports spotlight growing tensions in U.S.-South Africa relations over AFRICOM. The U.S. ambassador to South Africa, Eric Bost, complained that South Africa's defense minister Mosiuoa Lekota, was not responding to embassy requests to meet General Kip Ward, the recently nominated first commander of AFRICOM
AFRICOM is an extension of US military dominance in Africa
Africa Focus (Is an independent electronic publication providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus Bulletin is edited by William Minter, “Questioning AFRICOM” 8/1/07. http://allafrica.com/stories/200708010836.html) [Gunnarsdottir]
The Bush administration's new obsession with AFRICOM and its militaristic approach has many malign consequences. It increases U.S. interference in the affairs of Africa. It brings more military hardware to a continent that already has too much. By helping to build machineries of repression, these policies reinforce undemocratic practices and reward leaders responsive not to the interests or needs of their people but to the demands and dictates of U.S. military agents. Making military force a higher priority than development and diplomacy creates an imbalance that can encourage irresponsible regimes to use U.S. sourced military might to oppress their own people, now or potentially in the future. These fatally flawed policies create instability, foment tensions, and lead to a less secure world. What Africa needs least is U.S. military expansion on the continent (and elsewhere in the world). What Africa needs most is its own mechanism to respond to peacemaking priorities. Fifty years ago, Kwame Nkrumah sounded the clarion call for a "United States of Africa." One central feature of his call was for an Africa Military High Command. Today, as the African Union deliberates continental governance, there couldn't be a better time to reject U.S. military expansion and push forward African responses to Africa's priorities. Long suffering the effects of militaristic "assistance" from the United States, Liberia would be the worst possible base for AFRICOM. But there are no good locations for such a poorly conceived project. Africa does not need AFRICOM.